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I. Introduction
Risk, the probability of contingent harm, defines the modern human condition. 2 Estimating such probabilities, taking measures to reduce risks and avoid associated harms, but also putting in place instruments for managing the effects of harms that nevertheless occur-all are basic elements in the life of functioning communities, and therefore essential to the survival of their members. In such communities, individual and collective interests both shape and are shaped by an undeniable sense of shared destiny. Politics, the struggle over the distribution of the costs and benefits of communal decision or indecision, creates the capacity to deal with risks. Political conflict, however, can expand or erode the sense of shared destiny necessary to maintain it.
We might expect global risks--like the risks associated with climate change, nuclear energy production, the proliferation of high-technology weaponry, and systemic financial shocks--to stimulate similar reactions beyond the confines of established and bounded communities. Someday the most ambitious aspirations of communitarian theorists in this regard may be realized. Until then, there exists no unambiguous capacity to design and implement final risk assessment, compensation/prevention, and resolution strategies. Nevertheless, the incipient capacity to deal with global risks is becoming visible, even as its fundamental durability remains in question. This paper sets the conceptual groundwork for making and defending such an argument in a most sensitive area of contemporary policy-making, namely with regard to the foundational policies that must ultimately underpin well-functioning global financial markets.
II. Political authority and policy capacity in the face of global risks
Ulrich Beck long ago drew attention to mounting challenges facing humanity created not by nature but by our own ingenuity. 3 Given the current structure of the world's markets and politics, he hoped that thinking through their implications would move us all beyond the physical, psychological, and methodological boundaries of nations and nationalism. His intuition that considering the limits of conventional insurance schemes would help erode such boundaries lies behind this paper. To the extent we human beings have actually created new risks, they are inprinciple insurable, including by the most ancient insurance scheme conventionally called 'gov-2 Richard V. Ericson ernment.' 4 If we are in the realm of risk, we are in the realm of probability and rational estimation, but uncertainty is always in the background. The kinds of fundamental risks Beck emphasized reflect a high degree of 'manufactured' uncertainty that complicates such estimations and the measures needed to deal with them. Whether some or all global risks can in some way be rendered more manageable by insurance schemes is therefore an empirical and political question. For scholars of global governance, the challenge of conceptualizing responsive practices requires making an essential distinction between political authority--the right to govern, and policy capacity--the ability to govern.
The research agenda is huge, and this paper is not. On a broad and interdisciplinary analytical canvas, and as part of a larger project Edgar Grande and I now have underway, it focuses on one important aspect of a 'hard' case where the authority legitimately to manage and limit global risks is highly contested. My target is policy capacity in the arena of global finance, including but not limited to the capacity to design and implement insurance-like mechanisms. That target lies at the intersection of functional spillover and political conflict. The basic argument is that such a capacity is developing globally in the financial sector across the spectrum of measurement and assessment, compensation and prevention, and finally management and resolution, and that the issue of its legitimation becomes more tractable when we understand the different kinds of politics involved across that spectrum.
The Governance Problem
A transformation in political authority arguably occurs in three steps: the building of policy capacity (or power as it is commonly understood), the effective deployment of that capacity (or the actual solving of problems), and then the legitimation of that deployment (or wide-enough social acceptance that renders that capacity sustainable). Here, I take my cue from the political philosopher Thomas Nagel, who rejects the common view that legitimation needs to come first and only then can we affirm the emergence of political authority. 5 To use the language of international relations, 4 For solid conceptual as well as empirical reasons, Charles Tilly, evoking Thomas Hobbes and the ancients, put protection schemes at the center of his famous paper, "War-making and state-making as organized crime," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 169-191. 5 "While it is conceivable in theory that political authority should be created in response to an antecedent demand for legitimacy, I believe this is unlikely to happen in practice. What is more likely is the increase and deployment of power in the interests of those who hold it, followed by a gradual growth of pressure to make its exercise more just, and to free its organization from the historical legacy of the balance of forces that went into its creation. Unjust and illegitimate regimes are the necessary precursors of the progress toward legitimacy and democracy, because they create the centralized power that can then be contested, and perhaps turned in other directions without being destroyed. For this reason, I believe the most likely path toward some version of global justice is through the creation of patently unjust and illegitimate global structures of power that are tolerable to the interests of the most powerful problem-solving can occur in an imaginable policy space that ranges from autonomous national action to intergovernmental coordination to supranational governance. When it does, an effective capacity is developing even if its legitimacy remains in question. 6 The weight of the evidence sketched below supports the hypothesis that such a capacity is now evolving quite rapidly in a policy arena defined by financial risks and uncertainties. Since that capacity turns on fiscal policy, the traditional non-military core of state sovereignty, its emergence is puzzling in a world still prizing communal autonomy. For the same reason, the legitimation of that capacity remains problematic. various uncertainties that are difficult to unravel or that may take very long periods of time to become clear enough for informed speculation. Still, the events they portend very high losses that current nation-states. Only in that way will institutions come into being that are worth taking over in the service of more democratic purposes, and only in that way will there be something concrete for the demand for legitimacy to go to work on." Thomas Nagel, " cannot reasonably justify passivity. 9 In such contexts where the probability of disaster is low but its potential cost extravagantly high, the possibility of eliminating risks and clearing up uncertainties in the near term is an illusion. The challenge is to govern such risks against the backdrop of uncertainty. 10 What do I mean by 'governing' risks? I mean estimating and assessing them, seeking to prevent the harms they evoke, and managing and resolving emergencies when prevention fails. All of these tasks involve distributing associated costs--with finality. Effective and sustainable risk governance thus entails recognition, prudence, and legitimacy.
Risk, Uncertainty, and Insurance
Measuring, reducing, and pooling risks ex ante, as well as providing compensation ex post, describe the basic principles of insurance systems. Given shared expectations concerning outcomes and practical mitigation efforts, the more people who share, say, the risk of earthquakes, the cheaper will be their own protection costs and the lower will be their portion of the collective burden if an earthquake does occur. What about 'global' risks that by their nature are still shrouded by uncertainties but may plausibly be understood to extend beyond the jurisdiction and established capacities of particular societies? The scale of the dangers threatened means that above a certain threshold such risks can over-stretch the language of insurance. There exists no private firm or public agency authorized or able on its own to create big enough risk pools to manage them. When the disasters they estimate actually occur, the losses simply fall where they may.
The difficulty of imagining more adequate coverage for global risks, nevertheless, need not be an analytical end-point, nor should the assumption of uninsurability. Even as we begin to cross borders and zones of uncertainty, the language of insurance can still be helpful as a clarifying tool.
Indeed, it can be more than that if it is empirically true that actual insurers are sometimes willing to provide cover for risks they do not fully understand. 11 9 Charles Perrow has made the case most clearly for nuclear power. reinsurance firms now spread the risks of catastrophic fire far beyond city limits. And when those firms lose their bets that a fire will not occur, they also spread the losses and provide resources for recovery. True, they sometimes go bankrupt and do not pay out. Cross-border insurance markets today, however, are effective, broad, and deep, even if access to them remains unevenly distributed throughout the world.
Where conventional insurance schemes reach their limits, the nation-state has sometimes proven successful in expanding the boundaries of risk governance. 12 From Bismarck's day to our own, it has sometimes done so ex ante through mandatory risk pooling and public subsidy, and sometimes ex post by covering losses actually incurred. After 9-11, for example, the risk of global terrorism was taken out of many insurance and reinsurance policies. When subsequent incidents occurred, losses may or may not have been covered in whole or in part by particular governments, all of which could be expected to look first, and perhaps only, after their own citizens. In such cases, the limit has usually been defined by the fiscal capacity of the state, that is, the ability of organizations acting in the name of the state to attract or confiscate required insurance premia (taxes) from the population whose specific risks are in-principle covered. 13 Such limits have, in fact, sometimes been exceeded through intergovernmental arrangements. 14 Although modest in scale and scope, for example, agreements are in place among certain national governments to share some of the potential costs of disasters at nuclear power plants. The question before us is whether such arrangements constitute the absolute limit for 'governing' global risks,
including new risks that are moving out of the zone of radical uncertainty and into the zone of reasoned calculation.
where the new money is. By the time statistical probabilities are clear, serious profit is squeezed out of the business. In a competitive environment, the challenge is to make as informed a bet as possible on emerging risks still shrouded in uncertainty. 
The Limits of Intergovernmentalism
Restricted intergovernmental arrangements for global risk governance cannot be the end of the story for anyone other than closed-minded ideologues. It takes a fair dose of hubris to believe that human social evolution has somehow reached its end in our own day. On what grounds is it reasonable to assume that human ingenuity exhausted itself in the political construction of the nationstate? On what grounds is it reasonable to assert that although human beings can obviously continue to manufacture global risks, they absolutely cannot design accommodating instruments for managing them. To say the least, such an argument is implausible. There is no good reason to accept it. On the other hand, we must concede that the problem of designing effective tools for global risk governance can be formidable-or, as analysts now call it, 'super wicked '. 15 At this point, disciplined imagination must be called upon. Some may leap to the logical conclusion.
A 'world state' must lie just over the horizon, and a cosmopolitan philosophical tradition stands in readiness to provide justification. If the Kantian dream of a 'parliament of man' was the legacy of 18 th century wars, world federalist impulses revived it after both great twentieth-century wars.
Indeed, the idea of a global confederation resting on at least a modicum of human solidarity has sprung naturally to mind at every moment of systemic emergency since then. 16 It can be observed, nevertheless, that as soon as most emergencies ends and a semblance of calm returns, the shimmering spirit of solidarity often seems to disappear. But such a skeptical observation does not preclude a more modest quest.
Risks surrounded by uncertainties, by definition, are difficult to assess. The context for decision regarding them will be opaque. Strategic and tactical responses will be unclear. If the threats they suggest are serious, however, passivity can't be the only option. In a complex environment, we might expect to witness experimentation before solid risk calculations can be undertaken.
In the previous work upon which this paper builds, Edgar Grande and I argued that global risks are already the cause of a substantive and observable transformation of state functions. 17 and scope of the continuing transformation precludes ignoring it. Pretending it is not underway, however, may well be convenient for policy-makers as well as their constituents. Contrary to much popular commentary, moreover, we also observed that actual states are not all being cut back. Indeed, the scope of public-sector action is expanding within and across many contemporary societies. This is occurring, albeit in differentiated ways, despite the common-sense assertion of market liberals as well as keen students of the psychology and sociology of risk that decentralized systems without tight coupling between their various parts best accommodate failure and enhance resilience. 18 As discussed more fully below, a plausible answer to the 'too-big-to-fail' dilemma in finance and other arenas of risk is to break units down to a level where they are not 'too-big'. The fact, however, is that the scale and inter-connectedness of units constitutive of global risks continues to expand. After the crisis of 2008, big banks became bigger even as systemic risk likely migrated to burgeoning nonbanking financial institutions; cross-border and cross-sectoral linkages became more intricate. Similarly, after the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters, nuclear power was not seriously abandoned in Europe or Japan. To cite one more example, following various public health emergencies emanating from tightly linked global transportation chains, like the SARS epidemic in 2003, those systems became more, not less, integrated in many parts of the world.
We also noted that the continuing expansion and transformation of expectations concerning government action translates into the emergence of a zone of shared political responsibility, whether it is codified and explicitly acknowledged or not. As Grande and Zangl later contended, a key aspect of this evolution deserves emphasis. 19 Global risks shift the motivation for transnational state action from past and present to the future. At the center of policy attention across a range of issueareas is an increasingly undeniable awareness of tomorrow's potential catastrophes. 'Preventive governance' is thus driven by the imperative of avoidance. It needs to be seen as taking action not only after disasters have actually occurred. It is expected to anticipate threats induced by human behaviour, for it will be held by citizens and non-citizens alike as wholly or partially accountable for them.
Albert, Buzan, and Zürn allude to the same phenomenon by applying sociology's differentiation theory to international relations; they see segmented and still-stratified political systems in a condition of deepening tension with feasible and necessary functional responses to practical problems of governance. 20 Foucault highlighted this developing tension in his seminal analysis of 'governmen-tality'. The introduction of vaccinations against smallpox in the early 19 th century provided an apt reference point. Similarly, the fundamental logic and expansion of Keynesian economic policy in the mid-twentieth century aimed at the mitigation of risks. What is new today is the dawning realization that many preventive policies are futile unless they are pursued jointly by 'sovereign' political authorities.
Preventive governance in a collective sense has to decide pre-emptively how much systemic risk is acceptable to societies no longer separated by clear borders but still potentially exhibiting different risk tolerances. Adding to the difficulty is the reality noted above: those risks are riven by various deep channels of uncertainty, which render the determination of risk tolerances difficult. In stilldecentralized political settings, some authorities may be unwilling to accept high preventive costs, while others may be unwilling to accept anything less than strong precautionary measures entailing potentially very high opportunity costs. The result may satisfy no one and may actually enhance global risks, but it may also soon shift. 21 In contemporary Europe, for example, we have the recent experience of abundantly precautionary German authorities closing and banning nuclear power plants, while the authorities in some neighbouring lands satisfy themselves with modest measures to reduce the likelihood of future accidents. In these and other cases, such outcomes surely do not establish stable political end-points. Instead, they clarify contradictions and sharpen underlying political conflicts. Their unavoidably transnational logic is dynamic, not static.
Political Conflict and Functional Spillovers
The erosion of functional boundaries around the 'prevention' state confronts modern societies with an expanded problem in controlling political authority. The root of the problem is not the immoderation of citizens, but the crisis-driven immoderation of those with the emerging capacity to act in their name. Existing political controls in advanced societies were constructed within old walls that are becoming ever more ineffective, and defensible new walls cannot easily be built because of functional spillovers. Institutional transcendence and transformation must occur at the same time.
Because this is difficult, the transnational sharing of political authority made necessary by the scale and nature of global risks can change the role that law plays. In the middle of the twentieth century, Carl Schmitt anticipated such a change in its least appealing terms. When systemic emergency threatens the very existence of the state itself, law as an instrument of limited political authority can be replaced by law as an unbounded rationale for assertive political decision.
Global risks can evoke a permanent sense of emergency, so a consistent Schmittian argument would today subordinate any normative order to measures necessary to ensure systemic survival.
In Agamben's similarly bleak terms, in the 'state of exception' actual state authorities operate in a "no-man's land between public law and political fact, between legal order and life." 22 The 'state of exception' assumes its exemplary form during the tensest moments of crisis, when any constitutional limits to state action recede and generalized fears undercut resistance.
Global risks stretch two dimensions of political action, namely, the identities of key actors and the quality of their instruments. Preventive governance now reaches far beyond the traditional state and its apparatus. It relies on complex institutional settings and a diversity of actors. It also implies a substantial extension and interplay of measures to influence social behaviour. Despite its pathologies, we might expect the transnational prevention state to emerge through processes full of conflict, for pre-existing political bargains will likely be undermined. Because such processes will be as difficult to sustain as they will be necessary, we should also expect the locus of final decisionmaking to become blurred and multi-layered. International organizations, NGOs, multinational firms, and various kind of public and private networks will obfuscate final responsibilities. Decisions may still be made, but they may perhaps now often take the form of non-decisions. 23 The denial of obvious political responsibility, indeed, may help preserve and even strengthen the capacity of the prevention state. The instrumentality of impersonal markets or informal collaborative forums, boards, and standard-setting associations, may come to be seen as reasonably responsive to a functional logic that renders certain actions necessary. Ideological commitments to 'sovereignty' and 'democratic legitimacy' may remain, but their complexity-in-practice is deepened.
One problem may lead to a partial solution, contested but convenient. Its partiality may lead to failure, and the original problem may get worse. Conversely, the partial solution may raise the stakes against a complete reversal. Stumbling forward through political conflicts over responsibilities and outcomes may appear more attractive than any other feasible option. In the end, politicization and underlying legitimation dilemmas may themselves lead to systemic disasters, but they may also provide the spark for political innovation. 22 At key moments in a process that may indeed lead to such innovation, a good neofunctionalist might well argue, is the dawning realization of co-responsibility. Jean Monnet once predicted that what we now call the European Union would be built through crises and 'by stealth'. 24 Like David Mitrany, Leon Lindberg, and the early Ernst Haas, scholars labeled him a functionalist, and many came to criticize what they saw as a linear view of historical progress. In the dark shadow cast by Auschwitz, however, the early functionalists could not help but understand the possibility of profound reversals in human achievement. There could be nothing automatic about the construction of political institutions. They may have been ambitious, but they were not naïve. Monnet's wisdom, in particular, rather rested on the calculation of risks to the extent knowledge and memory would allow, on the balancing of prudent preventive measures with reasonable precautions, and on the ability of leaders to steer political conflicts in constructive directions. Uncertainty was the seedbed for such a pragmatic position, as it is for any other kind of faith. In the face of certainty, there is no need for faith.
Is a revived version of Monnet's faith warranted today by the contemplation of risks and uncertainties at the global level? Why would it not be? What would be the alternative? As long as we stay attentive to the possibility of failure, there is no reason to discount entirely the probability that a conflictual process in the shifting borderlands of risk and uncertainty can eventually nurture perceptions of co-responsibility among those with the capacity to act. Shared prior interests in enhancing that capacity may not be determinative, but without them forward movement would be more difficult. Again, in private insurance markets uncertainty does not necessarily lead to stasis.
It first stimulates efforts roughly to estimate the odds of catastrophe and the costs of ex ante precaution and ex post compensation. At the frontier of risk calculation and speculation, it then stimulates the pooling instinct, justified by the law of large numbers. Also at that frontier lies unavoidable political conflict. The 'prevention' state confronting unclear global risks and unavoidably collaborative relationships may move smoothly toward greater transnational burden sharing, although we cannot preclude the possibility that it may not. Such a question suggests even at this point in time a realistic approach to analyzing the capacity to govern global risks, an approach that distinguishes among the politics of risk assessment, of risk reduction and crisis prevention, and of compensation and resolution. Empirical observation promises to bring key differences into focus. In what follows, I draw illustrative material from the contemporary political economy of financial markets.
III. Global Financial Risks
The historical experience of social and political integration changed when sovereign nation-states in Europe began to claim "exclusive authority over a given territory and at the same time this territory was constructed as coterminous with that authority, in principle ensuring a similar dynamic in other nation-states." 26 In Europe and eventually elsewhere the authority of the state was asserted over markets and market economies that had arguably established themselves long before.
Market behavior thereafter could not easily be conceived as spontaneously derived from human nature. In a broader sense, older and looser economic linkages gave way to formal and informal arrangements shaped by nation-states, while relationships among those nation-states were ever more obviously mediated by financial markets. In this context and over time, national security, economic growth, and financial stability came to be associated more closely. At the risk of oversimplifying much, we can at least observe that since the dawn of modern capitalism the most trau- In contrast to the pre-1914 era, however, governments now just as routinely intervened to manage market emergencies. The political consequences were profound and no longer easily kept within national limits.
In the late 1990s, panic spread from stock to bond to banking markets in East Asia, and then to their counterparts in Russia, Latin America, and eventually to Wall Street. Ten years later, and as dis- Alan Greenspan, a great champion of market liberty before and after his time as chairman of the US Federal Reserve, conceded his "state of shocked disbelief" that a system that for forty years had been "working exceptionally well" came very close to collapsing in 2008. 29 In fact, his disbelief rested on the human frailty of disaster myopia, a frailty deeply rooted in modern financial markets. 30 Without confidence in the future, even if ill-informed, it would make little sense to save, invest, or speculate. In the end, Greenspan's disbelief only served to revive, presumably for a short time Contemporary financial markets rest on legal and therefore political foundations. Market actors need clear operating rules. Property rights have to be established and adjudicated when disputes arise. Procedures have to be in place to handle inevitable failures. The more dense the webs of financial interconnectedness become, the greater is the need to limit the chance that specific debt defaults cascade and engulf otherwise healthy borrowers and lenders. As Walter Bagehot made plain as early as 1873, some agency has to be entrusted with the responsibility and given the ability to act as lender-of-last-resort during liquidity crises. 32 In light of the risk that the very existence of a back-up insurance facility could tempt potential beneficiaries to act imprudently ('moral hazard'), last-resort lending had to be complemented by regulatory disincentives to rely upon it. To deal with extreme instability, when liquidity crises are difficult to differentiate from solvency crises and systemic collapse is plausibly threatened, that lender-of-last-resort also has to be backed by an The members of the contemporary eurozone are often viewed as exceptional in this regard. It is more accurate, however, to see them as mid-way through an experiment that will likely lead either to the regional integration of monetary, fiscal, and regulatory authorities or to the dis-integration of the regional economy as national authorities facing emergencies recover the full range of their prerogatives. A recent study focused on stability in the member-states of the eurozone puts the essential matter succinctly:
The ongoing process of European integration has led to European member states' economies becoming more closely interwoven. As a result, decisions or failure to take decisions on economic policy by individual countries no longer simply have an impact on their domestic economies but can also have a significant effect on growth and economic stability in every country in the eurozone. Today eurozone countries all share a common fate. 33 In Europe and beyond, however, economic interdependence is only one part of the story. Again, after 1945 and especially after 1947 when the Cold War commenced, it was the desire for economic growth that sparked processes of policy innovation that would eventually re-open and deepen financial markets, even at the risk of some 'instability'. Indeed, the second step was to try to limit that risk by assigning the bulk of regulatory and supervisory responsibilities to central banks and other official agencies, which would be expected to collaborate but only to the extent necessary to preserve their domestic orders. Most advanced states initiated some kind of deposit insurance scheme and central liquidity mechanism to ameliorate the risk of domestic bank runs, but most also tried to leave as much scope as domestic circumstances would allow for prudent self-discipline by market actors themselves. They have frequently been disappointed. 34 Across the developing world, a challenge repeatedly confronted in more recent decades has been to create similar facilities. When it could not be met, and especially when financial distress threatened global order, the supplementary resources and conditional lending practices of the International Monetary Fund were now available. Partly because the Fund's underlying authority was of a treatylimited and delegated nature, however, myriad economic and political controversies were always associated with its evolving crisis-management role. 33 
Recognizing and Assessing Global Financial Risks
Well into the 1980s, the main arenas within which national regulators sought to cooperate in their risk-recognition and measurement activities were easy to identify. World War, the BIS survived attempts to close it down after 1945. Thirty years later, after it had developed a profitable business managing central-bank reserves, it proved a convenient venue for monetary and financial meetings and a source of staff support. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was the first of the clubs to benefit from its existence. 37 The focus of the BCBS is at the micro-level, and specifically on large banks operating across national borders. In 1999, leading governments established the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to concentrate on the macroeconomic implications of the expanding operations of those financial institutions. As we shall see, 'macroprudential policies' came to the forefront when the FSF became the The fact that the implementation of Basel II left much discretion for national supervisors was only one source of future trouble. The accord soon appeared to enhance the competitive advantages and leverage of large money-center banks. Astute observers pointed out that its impact was 'procyclical,' that is, it encouraged banks excessively to restrict lending during recessions and imprudently to expand lending during booms. They were right.
Preventing Future Crises
After each banking crisis since 1973, better technical policy co-ordination was seen as necessary to promote the deepening integration of financial markets and to extend that experiment safely beyond the core of the system. Aside from Basel I and Basel II, one tangible consequence was the development of payment-settlement systems that promised to limit cascading defaults (real-time (Figure 2 below) . In their wake, the capacity of existing multilateral arrangements to preempt contagion across the markets to which those banks were now directly or indi-rectly connected proved inadequate. The politics of tacit intergovernmental understandings, together with reliance on inadequately equipped IOs, failed to preempt a systemic financial emergency that threatened the second Great Depression.
Figure 2
Source: US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, "Failed Bank List".
(http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html)
The attention of policy-makers now turned away from crisis prevention to crisis management.
Indicative of a rapidly broadening sense that more countries needed to be involved in both efforts was an expansion in the membership of the BCBS and other BIS-hosted clubs. By March 2009, the number of countries around the table grew from 13 to 27, with the inclusion of advanced developing countries from the G20. At the same time, the FSF became the FSB, and its staff was mandated to accelerate an ambitious work program on the constituent elements of more stable and resilient financial markets, including but not limited to capital buffers, minimum liquidity ratios, and maximum leverage requirements for banks and other financial institutions deemed to be 'systemically significant'. Although this episode in preventive institution- 
Managing Emergencies
Governments around the world intervened heavily and directly in global markets in the fall of 2008 and for many months afterwards. The United States in particular lent and invested monetary and fiscal resources lavishly. The beneficiaries included most of its own large financial institutions and many foreign institutions operating within and across its borders.
In the immediate aftermath of a US decision to let the Lehman Brothers investment bank fail outright, banks around the world confronted a drastic shortage of liquidity. In loosely coordinated operations, central banks pumped billions of dollars into money markets. Simultaneously, leading governments moved to ban the speculative short-selling of financial stocks. During the first days of October 2008, President Bush signed the $700 billion Emergency Economic Stabilization Act into law; $250 billion would be taken from the resulting fund and used to purchase troubled assets from American and foreign banks. Fearing economic collapse, central banks around the world simultaneously slashed short-term interest rates and pumped out cash. At this point, it was reasonable to ask whether the problem for many banks was one of liquidity, the traditional concern of central banks, or solvency. Consistent with signals coming out of the US Treasury, the Fed also provided massive swap facilities to many foreign central banks, which were themselves under pressure to lend dollars as well as local currency to support the stressed operations of their own banks at home. credibly threaten to bring down the whole system. The massive provision of liquidity can calm the situation, but it can also compound the resolution problem.
The architects of the post-1945 system considered economic instability to be the precursor of war. At Bretton Woods, therefore, they took the first steps in designing mechanisms that would limit the extent to which sovereign participants in the system would find themselves pushed to default on their debts. Time and again, from 1945 until the present moment, the main creditor states and the private financial institutions they license and regulate found themselves designing and redesigning substitutes for gunboat diplomacy, namely programmes that provide certain debtor states with the equivalent of last-resort lending facilities or of debt-restructuring services loosely analogous to those found in domestic bankruptcy courts.
In the early post-war decades, the main economic imbalances capable of derailing the system as a whole occurred in industrial countries. They typically manifested themselves as currency crises (when governments sought to defend the par value of their currencies while running substantial trade deficits), so it was no coincidence that the IMF was often enlisted afterwards to bless new currency pegs or unorthodox financial arrangements. During the 1980s and 1990s, the main crises capable of destabilizing the system began in emerging markets, and more often than not conditional IMF assistance could be called upon. For certain developing countries, and mainly when intermediaries in advanced countries were threatened, sovereign debt rescheduling and restructuring became more commonplace. International banks as well as official agencies providing export credits also organized themselves into negotiating groups (the so-called Lon- Financial crises in the past certainly did promote such solidarity within many civil societies, and the modern state itself is the outcome. Something akin to this kind of development is arguably occurring right now within the eurozone, as financial crisis forges just enough of a sense of solidarity--a wide enough realization of 'shared fate'--to sustain an evolving regional capacity for crisis resolution. 44 The European System of Central Banks coordinated by the European Central Bank is already playing its part, and so is a more ambitious plan for identifying and limiting excessive national fiscal deficits. But state-like instruments hardly signal the only imaginable pathway to an adequate-enough capacity for resolution. Even within the eurozone, there is no shortage of good ideas for pragmatic substitutes for a still-infeasible European finance ministry.
The most palatable include collective insurance programs. 45 A new experiment along this line lies at the heart of the regional plan affirmed early in 2014 by the European Commission, the Council, and the Parliament to establish a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for important cross-border banks. The plan builds on the 2012 assignment to the ECB of overarching supervisory responsibilities for those banks, after a near-term clean-up of troubled balance sheets. A Single Resolution Fund (SRF) will gradually be financed by national levies on the banks and then by mutualizing 60% of the resulting pools. The common fund of the European Stability Mechanism, a fund created mainly by government-backed bonds floated in private markets around the world, is already in place to back up the SRF; it is able to be expanded as and when required. Although the SRM still implies no common finance ministry, it does incline the regional emergency management system in the direction of more deeply coordinated fiscal responses when warranted. In the absence of such coordination, there would be little hope of actually preventing the single financial market, a longstanding EU objective, from fragment- 46 There is, no doubt, a certain irony in the fact that German resistance to fiscal transfers during the recent crisis (and insistence that austerity marked the route out of crisis for the most troubled members of the eurozone) contributed to fragmenting tendencies within the European single market and is now matched by apparent German support for a long-term, insurance-based system designed to prevent future crises and to counter the momentum of market system. 50 Those arrangements stopped short of establishing definitive resolution mechanisms for the future, but they did stimulate new work in various forums for post-crisis risks assessment and future crisis prevention. Indeed, we can see that a few signal experiments are now being designed, including one focused on forcing cross-border banks, in consultation with their supervisory colleges, to make reasonable arrangements for their own funerals. 51
The way the crisis of 2008 was actually managed did, nevertheless, heighten market expectations that systemically significant financial institutions, and that the larger experiment in global integration they represented, would persist. That this translates into implicit subsidies for those institutions, especially during emergencies but also in 'normal' times, would now become obvious. 52 That those subsidies may also once again encourage imprudent risk-taking and render global markets more not less fragile has also led governments (and organized interest groups) straight back to the agenda of global risk measurement and crisis prevention. Here is the essence of functional spillover. The path ahead is filled with moral hazards and other significant political complexity, but the path back looks blocked by the institutional consequences of prior policy decisions.
Understanding full well the implications for their fiscal accounts if they could not come up with prompt and effective risk assessment and crisis prevention measures, those same governments are now trying to revive market discipline by ostensibly making it more difficult to organize bailouts the next time. The US Treasury and the Federal Reserve, for example, sensed manifold domestic and international pressures that may complicate, or even preclude, the kinds of measures they took in 2008. 'Saving' big domestic and foreign banks from the consequences of their own mistakes was never going to be popular, even if the alternative seemed worse at the Unless or until fiscal authority moves to the level implied by globalizing markets, effective policy capacity and durable political legitimation will remain in profound tension. Experimentalism is indeed the order of the day, and institutional innovations like the Basel Process may for a time help us live with such tensions. So too might an expansion in the kinds of cross-national risk pools public and private insurance systems can facilitate. Although straightforward ex ante burden-sharing agreements remain elusive, repeated ad hoc arrangements during and after crises do certainly give rise to reasonable expectations of future regulatory, monetary, and fiscal coordination.
The anticipation and resolution of financial crises look set to define arenas where seriously creative politics will remain required. Who among us would contend that human beings in increasingly complex social relationships with one another on a global scale cannot live with such tensions or with such politics? That we are left with difficult normative, moral, and distributive questions is undeniable. If we are lucky, we can together provide good answers just as those structures are consolidated.
